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SAILING THE UNCHARTED SEAS OF ASBESTOS
LITIGATION UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
SAMUEL J. SMrIH*
AND
STEPHEN J. BIREK, JR.**
Maritime workers injured through exposure to asbestos dust
have a choice of forums in which to process their claims. ' Most
claimants, however, will choose to proceed in the federal forum
pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act (LHWCA)2 because the Act is more generous than most
* Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, Benefits Review Board, United States Department
of Labor.
** Senior Division Attorney, LongshorelBlack Lung Division, United States Department
of Labor.
1. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 100 S. Ct. 2432, 2437-38 (1980).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). In order to be covered by the LHWCA, a claimant must
be injured on a covered situs while he or she meets the status test. Generally, status refers
to the nature of the work whereas situs refers to the place of performance. The situs test
provides compensation for an "employee" whose disability or death "results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)." Id. § 903(a).
The status test defines an employee covered under the Act as "any person engaged in mari-
time employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring oper-
ations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker." Id.
§ 902(3). See generally A BENFmrrs Rav. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 6-8 to 6-18 (1978). Prior to
1972, the LHWCA contained only a strict situs test, which covered only claimants injured
"seaward of the gangplank." Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 100 S. Ct. 2432, 2436 (1980); A
BENEFrrs REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) at 6-8. In 1972, Congress expanded the definition of situs
to include injuries occurring on land and also added the status requirement. Longshore-
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state compensation statutes.' Practitioners representing clients
pursuing or defending a claim for compensation under the
LHWCA based upon asbestos-related occupational disease will
find themselves sailing on largely uncharted seas. The practitioner
continually will be confronted with the questions of how to prove
or disprove the existence of an asbestos-related disease and its se-
quelae4 and how to demonstrate the effects of the disease on the
particular claimant alleging some degree of disability from it. In
the context of the LHWCA, as in most workers' compensation
schemes, this requires proof of a disabilty that is either permanent
or temporary, and either partial or total.5 Consequently, the vari-
ety of issues lends itself to limited generalization. The object of
this article is to emphasize that the practicing attorney can man-
age the case most effectively by understanding the two primary
facets: first, the essential medical aspects of proving the existence
and extent of an asbestos-related impairment from the objective
medical data; second, the manner in which the impairment created
by the disease reduces the person's ability to perform his or her
usual occupation. In short, the practitioner must demonstrate the
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86
Stat. 1251 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a) (1976)). For a discussion of the status and
situs requirements see P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 72-81 (1979), and Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 256-65 (1977).
3. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 100 S. Ct. 2432, 2438 & n.7 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4707.
Because most state workmen's compensation awards are not treated as final or conclusive,
an injured worker may commence an action in the state forum pursuant to the state com-
pensation statute and then attempt to make up the difference between state and federal
benefit levels by seeking relief in the federal forum under the LHWCA. Sun Ship, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 100 S. Ct. at 2438 & n.6. However, in light of Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 100 S. Ct. 2647 (1980) (plurality opinion), in the subsequent federal adjudication
arising out of the same injury, the claimant will be bound by any factual determinations
made in the prior state proceeding. Id. at 2660-61.
4. "Sequela" is defined as "any lesion or affectation following or caused by an attack of
disease." DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1367 (24th ed. 1965). The extent to
which sequelae are compensable under the LHWCA is open to litigation. See Fly v. Peabody
Coal Co., 8 BENm'rrs REv. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 1001 (1978), and Bennett v. Leckie Smoke-
less Coal Co., 4 BENEFITS REv. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 420 (1976), modified, 7 BENEFITS REV.
BD. SERv. (BENDER) 267 (1977), for examples of the treatment of this issue by the Benefits
Review Board. The Board was established pursuant to § 21 of the LHWCA, "to hear and
determine appeals raising a substantial question of law or fact taken by any party in interest
from decisions with respect to claims of employees" under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1976).
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1976).
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basic legal question at issue: the existence of a disability compen-
sable under the Act.
The forum for accomplishing this task is the admnistrative pro-
ceeding. The process begins at the deputy commissioner level,
where responsibility for initial adjudication of the claim resides.' If
an interested party requests a hearing,7 the deputy commissioner
transfers the case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges,8
where an evidentiary hearing is held under the strictures of the
Administrative Procedure Act.9 Because of the nature of the ad-
ministrative proceeding, the problems of proof associated with
strict adherence to the rules of evidence are eliminated.10 Con-
ducted under the directive to "inquire fully into all matters at is-
sue" and limited only by the relevance, materiality, and reliability
of the evidence presented," the fact-finding process is far reaching
in its acceptance of medical documentation, testimony, and
hearsay.12
As in all adjudicatory proceedings, it is of utmost importance to
develop fully the case at the trial or hearing level. Counsel must
keep in mind that a decision and order of the administrative law
judge is directly appealable to the Benefits Review Board and ulti-
mately appealable to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the circuit in which the injury arose.13 The scope of review for
6. Id. § 919(a).
7. "[Ulpon application of any interested party [the deputy commissioner] shall order a
hearing [on the claim]." Id. § 919(c).
8. Id. § 919(d).
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
10. The Board, however, has suggested a particular format for examining physicians in
relation to distinguishing multiple pulmonic components in black lung cases. See Blevens v.
Peabody Coal Co., 9 BENEarrs REv. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 510 (1978). Specifically, the examin-
ing attorney must lay a proper foundation for the physician's testimony. He should ask
whether it is medically feasible to distinguish the components with any degree of medical
certainty, whether the component causing the injury may be determined with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, whether the doctor has an opinion as to the origin, and, finally,
what the opinion is. Id. at 516. See also Legate v. Island Creek Coal Co., 9 BENEFrrs REV.
BD. SERV. (BENDER) 113 (1978); Rogers v. Ziegler Coal Co., 9 BENEFrrs REV. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 62 (1978).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 702.338 (1980); see 33 U.S.C. § 923 (1976).
12. Longo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 11 BENEFrrs REv. Bn. SERV. (BENDER) 654 (1980)
(upholding the admission into evidence of an ex parte medical report which was determined
to be hearsay).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1976).
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the court and the Board is essentially the same; a decision and or-
der of an administrative law judge must be affirmed if it is ra-
tional, in accordance with law, and supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record considered as a whole. 14 In light of this limited
scope of review, counsel must convince the administrative law
judge of the basic medical and legal theories of the case. Conse-
quently, the attorney's efforts must be directed at building the
most favorable record possible at this level. Through presentation
of adequate medical data concerning the existence of the disease,
the causal nexus between work activity and the disease, and the
extent of disability, the administrative law judge's decision can
have a basis in the record comporting with the medical realities
and the legal requirements of the Act. The otherwise worthy appel-
lant who fails to provide such a record prevents the Benefits Re-
view Board, constrained as it is by its scope of review, from apply-
ing its powers of reversal, remand, or affirmation. 15
Although the rules of evidence are relaxed, the rules of prudence
are not. The practitioner must approach each case for what it
is-an adversary proceeding in which the compensation sought for
14. O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, Assocs., 380 U.S. 359, 362 (1965); John W.
McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 289 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1961); 33 U.S.C. § 921(3) (1976).
15. The Benefits Review Board also administers Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, the Black Lung Benefits Act. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (Supp. II 1978).
By comparison, the LHWCA is poorly equipped to deal with occupational lung disease adju-
dications. The Black Lung Benefits Act provides an irrebuttable presumption of total disa-
bility based on a finding of complicated pneumoconiosis, an advanced stage of the disease.
Id. § 921(c)(3). It also provides for a presumption of causal nexus between the disease and
coal mine employment premised on proof of ten years of qualifying coal mine employment.
Id. § 921(c)(1). The same ten years of employment carries a presumption of death due to
the disease if the miner dies of a respirable disease. Id. § 921(c)(2). Despite negative x-ray
evidence, fifteen years of qualifying employment creates a presumption that pneumoconiosis
exists if the miner can show the existence of a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pul-
monary impairment. Id. § 921(c)(4). Finally, twenty-five years of qualifying employment
prior to January 1, 1971, and death prior to March 1, 1978, establishes a presumption of
entitlement for survivors' benefits unless it can be shown that the miner was not even par-
tially disabled by the disease prior to death. Id. § 921(c)(5). The Department of Labor regu-
lations contain pulmonary function study tables, blood gas tables, and other criteria from
which the existence of the disease and its disabling effects can be measured. 20 C.F.R. §§
410.424, .426, 727.203(a) (1980). In contrast, no medical standards for occupational diseases
have been promulgated to date by the Department of Labor for use under the LHWCA.
Attorneys litigating asbestos cases would be wise to familiarize themselves with the develop-
ing case law construing the Black Lung Benefits Act to apprise themselves of the issues
involved in proving an occupational lung disease case.
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alleged industrial injury based on occupational disease can easily
total over $500,000 in lifetime and survivor's benefits. The practi-
tioner clearly should prepare and try any asbestos case under the
Act with the same care and attention to detail as one would use in
trying a civil suit of equal monetary value.
MEDICAL ASPECTS
Asbestos diseases, whether occupationally related or not, mani-
fest themselves primarily in one of three ways: (1) respiratory or
pulmonary effects, (2) cardiac effects, and (3) cancers. To prevail,
plaintiff's counsel must offer proof of the existence and extent of
an asbestos disease using the most accurate objective medical data
relating to each of these manifestations. A large selection of medi-
cal diagnostic and testing techniques is available to identify cardio-
respiratory impairments. These methods include: physical exami-
nation and history; a full battery of pulmonary function studies
covering before-exercise, during-exercise, and after-exercise func-
tions, as well as preexercise and postexercise administration of
bronchodilators; blood gas analysis with similar variables; x-rays;
computerized axial tomographic (CAT) scans; bronchoscopy; bi-
opsy; electrocardiograms; sputum syology; and others. Several of
these will be highlighted as the most effective in proving the case.
Accurate and complete medical evidence is crucial in asbestos
cases. While documentation, interrogatories, and written medical
reports may be adequate for the informal adjudication at the dep-
uty commissioner level, live medical testimony will be used by the
alert practitioner at the hearing level, because even the most de-
tailed medical report will lack the persuasiveness and flexibility of
live medical testimony.
Pulmonary/Respiratory Effects
The body's pulmonary or respiratory mechanisms-the trachea,
bronchial tree, lungs, pulmonary arteries, veins, capillary bed, and
heart-provide the vital ventilation, perfusion, and diffusion func-
tions of the body by replacing carbon dioxide with oxygen in the
blood. When inhaled in sufficient quantity, asbestos dust affects all
of these functions. Asbestosis is primarily a restrictive disease in
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its effect on ventilation."' The organisms and tissue in the lungs
react with asbestos dust in such a way as to lay down fibrotic (scar-
like) tissue which replaces the normally elastic lung cells. This pro-
cess makes it increasingly difficult for the lungs to expand and con-
tract when inhaling and exhaling. For this reason, the patient will
often complain of the onset of progressive dyspnea (shortness of
breath). There may be mild to moderate chest pain and bilateral
interstitial rales at the lung bases,"' sometimes described as crack-
ling sounds. Findings from pulmonary function data in patients
having asbestosis follow the classic pattern of restrictive lung dis-
ease. Because of the low compliance (inelasticity) or high recoil
pressure, the lung volumes are small, with decreased vital and total
lung capacity and increased air flow rates resulting from this "stiff
lung" syndrome.""
Following this general medical description, therefore, the dili-
gent attorney should build the record on pulmonary function study
data which demonstrate the claimant's total lung volume and vital
capacity.19 Obstructive manifestations may appear in the maxi-
mum breathing capacity (MBV-MVV) and forced expiratory vol-
ume (FEV) pulmonary function studies, but are of lesser impor-
tance than restrictive symptoms in asbestos disability evalu-
ations2 The practitioner, however, should have a complete battery
of tests performed for accurate diagnostic purposes. For example,
close examination of the study results may reveal clear distinctions
between the obstructive component of a respiratory impairment
and the restrictive component. One case study demonstrates that
exercise testing, if properly conducted and evaluated, can suggest
causes of disabilty other than a restrictive asbestos-related disease.
16. . SELIKOFF & D. Ln, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 152 (1978). The term "restrictive" refers
to the progressively reduced ability of the lung to expand, resulting from interstitial thick-
ening and fibrosis in the lung tissues. Id.
17. C. GUENTER & M. WELCH, PULMONARY MEDICINE 539 (1977).
18. Golden, Asbestos Related Disease, 131 W.J. MED. 225, 229 (1979).
19. Vital capacity refers to the maximal amount of air that can be expelled from the lung
after maximum inhalation. DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 246 (24th ed.
1965).
20. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 152. But see Weill, Ziskind, Waggenspack &
Rossiter, Lung Function Consequences of Dust Exposure in Asbestos Cement Manufactur-
ing Plants, 30 ARCHIVES OF ENvTr'L HEALTH 88 (1975). "Obstructive" elements refer to air-
way blockages. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 152.
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The patient was a cigarette smoker with some obstructive lung
disease. Radiographic examination showed small calcified pla-
ques. On exercise, the minute ventilation was appropriate for in-
creasing work load. Furthermore, the alveolar-arterial difference
was not large and fell with exercise. In fact, an improving alveo-
lar-arterial oxygen difference on exercise is consistent with
chronic bronchitis. In this case we were able to conclude that the
patient had been exposed to asbestos-however, pulmonary
function on exercise was that of a person with chronic bronchitic
changes.2 1
Pulmonary compliance should be measured as an additional ex-
pression of this stiff lung syndrome. Such tests record the change
in volume of the lung in relation to a given change in pressure and
will reveal any restrictive effect.22 Accordingly, counsel should em-
phasize lung volumes, vital capacity, and pulmonary compliance.
Research has shown that a "cardinal diagnostic sign" of asbesto-
sis is a reduction in the diffusion capacity of the lungs.23 Such a
dysfunction is best measured by the carbon monoxide diffusing ca-
pacity test, the values for which are expressed by the symbol DLCo.
Diffusion defects are often the first detectable abnormality of the
pulmonary system.2' Such defects are caused by fibrosis/scar tissue
completely obliterating the functional lung tissue or by scar tissue
forming in the thin membrane wall between the alveoli and the
pulmonary capillary. The result in each instance is interference
with the flow of oxygen into the blood and of carbon dioxide into
the lung. Because of these changes, there will be a widening of the
alveolar-arterial oxygen (A-AO,) gradient in these patients.2 5 As
the lungs lose their capacity to oxygenate the blood, the patient's
respiration rate increases, and cyanosis and clubbing may develop.
Here again, the practitioner must be able to recognize the widening
in the A-A0 2 gradient and reduction in the DLco value, to interpret
the extent of these aberrations, and to determine the effect of
these aberrations on the patient's ability to perform his or her oc-
21. Golden, supra note 18, at 230.
22. D. BATES, P. MACKLM & R. CHRISTIE, RESPIRATORY FUNCTION IN DISEASE 382 (2d ed.
1971).
23. Id.
24. . SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 156.
25. C. GuE = & M. WELCH, supra note 17, at 540.
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cupation, that is, to assess their effect in terms of disability.
The physical changes caused by the development of fibrotic tis-
sue in the lungs also manifest themselves on x-rays. Unlike the
pulmonary function study and diffusion capacity test, the x-ray is
helpful in identifying the presence of asbestosis, but is not deter-
minative of the amount of impairment in lung function, 2 because,
for example, diffusion impairments often occur prior to x-ray evi-
dence of the disease. As the-radiologic appearance of the disease
increases, however, the lung impairment generally increases.
Therefore, to the extent that x-ray evidence is helpful, the attor-
ney should be searching for the unique signs of asbestos diseases.
In identifying asbestosis radiographically, the practitioner
should note its three stages of development: (1) fine fibrotic struc-
tures resembling a net located predominantly in the lower lung
zones; (2) a combination of more pronounced interstitial fibrosis
with chronic pleural thickening; and (3) the latest stage of ad-
vanced fibrosis.27 In the early stages of asbestosis, the claimant de-
velops interstitial fibrotic changes sometimes characterized as hav-
ing a "ground glass" or hazy appearance. 28 As the interatitial
fibrosis increases, the "honeycomb" lung effect may become promi-
nent on the claimant's x-ray.2 9 Although the heart borders on the
x-ray are frequently described as having a shaggy appearance be-
cause of partial obscurations, 0 extensive opacities in the lung
fields are not common.
In addition to changes in the lungs themselves, x-rays may iden-
tify the development of plaques, either calcified or noncalcified, in
the pleura (lining of the lungs). While the formation of these pla-
ques may result from other disease processes, some authorities be-
lieve that multiple pleural plaques are so specific that asbestos ex-
26. J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, RESPIRATORY DISEASES 527-28 (2d ed. 1975). See Golden,
supra note 18, at 228.
27. D. BATES, P. MACKLEM & R. CHRISTIE, supra note 22, at 382.
28. 1 R. FRASER & J. PARE, DIAGNOSIS OF DISEASES OF THE CHEST 424 (2d ed. 1977).
29. C. GUENTER & M. WELCH, supra note 17, at 539. "Honeycombed" lungs are character-
ized by the formation of cysts which thicken the fibrous walls of the lung and by gross
distortion and often obliteration of the intervening lung elements. See 1 R. FRASER & J.
PARE, supra note 28, at 429.
30. C. GUENTER AND M. WELCH, supra note 17, at 539. See generally J. CROFTON & A.
DOUGLAS, supra note 26, at 528; I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 157. See also N.
PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, CHEMICAL HAZARDS OF THE WORKPLACE 112 (1978).
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posure can be concluded, absent other occupational talc or mica
exposure. 1 Multiple pleural plaques often appear on the dia-
phragm and, if bilateral, are a distinctive characteristic of asbestos
exposure.-2 Plaques may also appear on the pericardium (heart lin-
ing).33 Additional pleural changes which may be visualized on x-ray
are chronic thickening and benign pleural effusion.
Cardiac Effects
Asbestosis has been related to heart disease and, more specifi-
cally, to cor pulmonale.35 Cor pulmonale occurs when the fibrosis
and destruction of tissue in the lungs increase the resistance of
blood flow through the pulmonary capillary bed. This creates pul-
monary hypertension which puts a strain on the right ventricle of
the heart. The ventricle becomes hypertrophied (enlarged) and
eventually collapses under the strain. The practitioner should note,
however, that cor pulmonale is a nonspecific response; it can be
triggered by other lung disorders, such as emphysema, which occur
in the absence of occupational asbestos exposure. 6 It is important,
therefore, either to assign a specific cause to the impairment or to
limit the range of causes through expert testimony based on rea-
sonable medical certitude. Cor pulmonale may be diagnosed from
x-rays showing a skewed cardiothoracic ratio, from electrocardio-
grams displaying specific changes, or from actual measurement
during autopsy. However, the practitioner should distinguish mere
right ventricular hypertrophy, which may accompany arterioscle-
rotic heart disease, from a true diagnosis of cor pulmonale.
31. 3 R. F!RSER & J. PARES, supra note 28, at 1781.
32. Golden, supra note 18, at 226.
33. J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 26, at 526.
34. 3 R. FRASER & A. PARE, supra note 28, at 1781; L SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16,
at 191-200.
35. L SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 14. See 2 W. ANDERSON & J. KISSANE, PATHOL-
OGY 1095 (7th ed. 1977). Cor pulmonale is defined as "heart disease secondary to disease of
the lungs or of their blood vessels." DoRLAND's ILLusTrATU MEDICAL DiCrIoNARY 343 (24th
ed. 1965). In asbestos exposure cases, this disease may result from the destruction of the
pulmonary capillary bed by fibrosing processes. L SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 149.
36. D. BATEs, P. MAcKas & R. CHRISTIE, supra note 22, at 164.
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Cancers
Since at least 1960, asbestos exposure has been demonstrated to
be related to the development of mesothelioma (tumors of the
membranes). Generally, this disease is defined as a primary neo-
plasm (abnormal growth) of the pleura.3 7 Unlike the development
of asbestosis, there is no dose-response curve which is reliable.8
For example, increased incidence of mesothelioma tumors has been
found in persons who had merely washed the clothing of asbestos
workers and in persons who lived in the same household with an
asbestos worker. Living in the neighborhood of an asbestos mine or
mill has also been found to increase the incidence of mesothe-
liomas.39 Additionally, the length of time between the first expo-
sure to asbestos and the tumor development ranges from as little
as three and one-half years to a maximum of seventy-three years,
with an average latency period of approximately thirty-seven
years.4 0 Mesothelioma is virtually untreatable and invariably re-
sults in early death. 1
Mesothelioma tumors occur either in the pleura or the perito-
neum (lining of the abdominal and pelvic walls). The onset of
these tumors is insidious because by the time the tumor manifests
itself in loss of breathing capacity and pleural or abdominal pain,
it is usually far advanced. Mesothelioma is diagnosed primarily by
x-ray, usually after removal of accumulated effusion (fluid) in the
pleural space. The practitioner should look for signs of this pleural
effusion, irregular pleural thickening, or mass shadows which may
appear to be pulmonary rather than pleural.42 Because of the es-
tablished causal connection between asbestos exposure and
mesothelioma, the claimant's problems center on proving an indus-
37. J. CROFrON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 26, at 525; 3 R. FRASER & J. PARE, supra note
28, at 1511; C. GUENTER & M. WELCH, supra note 17, at 540; N. PROCTER & J. HUGHES,
supra note 30, at 112-13; I. SELicoFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 242-43.
38. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 262. While a certain "trigger" dose may be
required to initiate the carcinogenesis, further dosage does not affect the ultimate appear-
ance of the tumor, assuming the individual lives for the period required for development. Id.
Further, the size of the triggering dose varies greatly from individual to individual, depend-
ing on such factors as overall tissue susceptibility. Id.
39. Id. at 265-66.
40. Id. at 262-69.
41. Id. at 303; N. PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, supra note 30, at 112-13.
42. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 251.
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trial exposure to asbestos. The absence of any dose-response rela-
tionship and the long latency period, however, make this task ex-
tremely difficult.
When defending a mesothelioma claim, the practitioner should
contest the identification of the disease. Mesothelioma may be
mimicked by other diseases such as anaplastic peripheral carci-
noma (relatively undifferentiable cancer) or diffuse fibrosarcoma
(widespread lung cancer). In addition, what is diagnosed as
mesothelioma may actually be a pleomorphic metastasis (spread of
the disease) from a primary tumor located elsewhere.43 Biopsies
and autopsies should be performed properly, with the exact histol-
ogy of the tumor indicated.
In addition to mesothelioma, significant exposure to asbestos
produces a definite increase in the expected incidence of lung car-
cinoma." Asbestos exposure can also increase stomach, colon, and
rectum carcinomas. 45 Although there are indications of a dose-
response relationship between lung cancer and asbestos exposure,
"short exposure is enough; more raises the prevalence only slightly
if at all, but can accelerate the development of the disease."' 6 Ciga-
rette smoking, however, plays an important role in the increased
lung cancer risk and may indeed be the dominant factor.47 Ciga-
rette smoking and asbestos appear to be cocarcinogens and to-
gether may increase the incidence of lung cancer 100-fold. 48 Conse-
43. Id. at 244.
44. See, e.g., 2 W. ANDERSON & J. KssANE, supra note 35, at 1095. See generally N.
PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, supra note 30, at 289-94, 313-32; I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note
16, at 307-36. Studies indicate the incidence to be as high as seven to ten times the rate
otherwise predicted. 2 W. ANDERSON & J. KISSANE, supra note 35, at 1095; C. GUENTER & M.
WELCH, supra note 17, at 540.
45. See generally Hammond, Selikoff & Seidman, Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smoking
and Death Rates, 330 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 473 (1979).
46. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 16, at 319.
47. Id. at 330. See L. CAsARE'r & L. DOULL, TOXICOLOGY, THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS
352 (1975); N. PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, supra note 30, at 473-96.
48. C. GUENTER & M. WELCH, supra note 17, at 540. This synergistic effect makes it
nearly impossible to separate causes, especially important in light of the classic aggravation
rule as applied in cases under the LHWCA. See Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 61
F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1932). In Pacific, a stevedore died as the result of a collapsed lung. Au-
topsy results revealed the presence of fouled liquid in the lung, indicating a preexisting
condition. There was some disagreement as to whether the strain of the decedent's work
caused the lung to collapse. The Commissioner had found that the injury was work pro-
voked despite some testimony that the lung could have collapsed without exertion. The
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quently, when reductions in pulmonary function or lung cancers
are alleged to be the cause of a disability, a history of cigarette
smoking will cloud the diagnostic picture and make cases involving
marine workers who smoke the most difficult to litigate.
The area encompassing lung, stomach, colon, and rectum carci-
nomas is a significant battleground in the adjudication of asbestos-
related workers' compensation cases under the Act. Problems arise
because these diseases are nonspecific to asbestos exposure and
may be caused by factors wholly unrelated to work activity. The
difficulty in identifying the cause of the tumor is compounded by
the virtual impossibility of identifying the exact origin of a large
tumor. If asbestos caused development of the tumor, the specific
tissue in which the initiating asbestos fibers may be found will
have been obliterated by the neoplastic growth. Furthermore, al-
though the epidemiological data clearly show increased incidence
of these cancers in asbestos workers, these data are not dispositive
evidence that the particular claimant has an asbestos-related can-
cer. Accordingly, the practitioner must scrutinize the biopsy and
autopsy information, especially the histology of the tumor. The at-
torney must closely question the medical expert concerning the or-
igin of any lung, stomach, colon, or rectum cancer to ascertain if it
is a metastatic growth from a distinct source. Objective data such
as microscopic pathology reports, including electron microscopy
when available, should be used to support any findings. If the ori-
gin of the cancer cannot be established conclusively, the physician
should testify as to its origin based upon a reasonable degree of
medical certainty.
LEGAL ASPECTS
Proving the existence of an asbestos-related disease is only one-
half of the case. Proof of the relationship of the disease to a work
activity covered under the LHWCA and of the extent to which the
employer argued that the preexisting condition took the death outside of the Act because
damage would not have resulted except for the disease. The court rejected this argument.
Id. at 102.
Practitioners, however, should not overlook the possible application of § 8(f) of the Act in
such situations. Section 8(f) provides limitations on employer liability where the injury in-
creased a previously known disability. See notes 72-76 infra & accompanying text.
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resulting impairment renders the claimant disabled is also re-
quired. The practitioner must distinguish clearly between a medi-
cal determination of the existence and effects of an impairment
and the ultimate legal determination of disability. For example, a
fifty percent reduction in pulmonary diffusing capacity, DLco, is
not necessarily the equivalent of a fifty percent partial disability.
When the extent of impairment is applied to the facts of the case,
a fifty percent reduction may be totally disabling to a claimant in-
volved in heavy manual labor, whereas the same impairment may
not be disabling to a claimant whose duties are sedentary. In mak-
ing this distinction clear, the Benefits Review Board has rejected
specifically automatic equation of the medical impairment with the
extent of disability.49 This position implements the well-known
principle under the LHWCA that disability is not a purely medical
question but an economic one built on a medical foundation.5
What medical standards may be used to establish the extent of
disability? Except for schedule losses,51 the Act and implementing
regulations list no medical standards identifying the extent of disa-
bility associated with specific impairments. Counsel must rely,
therefore, on expert testimony and documentation to prove the ex-
tent of disability. Such proof involves the interrelationship of the
extent of impairment with the physical demands of the usual em-
ployment and the particular claimant's residual functional capac-
ity. It may be helpful to have the medical expert consider the
Guides to the Evaluation of Disability of the American Medical
Association.5 2 The practitioner may look to the standards for de-
termining pulmonary total disability used by the Social Security
49. Hess v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 11 BENEFITS RE v. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 149 (1979); Van Dyke v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8 BENEFITS
REv. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 388, 393 (1978).
50. Perini Corp. v. Heyde, 306 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.R.I. 1969). Thus, consideration
must be given to the claimant's age, education, industrial history, and the availability of
alternate employment should the claimant be unable to perform his usual work. Eaddy v.
Ruckert Terminals Corp., 10 BENFIrrs REv. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 31, 33 & n.43 (1979).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 908(c) (1976) (specifying amount of compensation for specific types of
disability).
52. COMMITTEE ON RATING OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, AMERICAN MEDICAL As-
SOCIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 67-77 (1977). Note, how-
ever, that the Guides deal primarily with forced expiratory volumes and maximal voluntary
ventilation so that any medical evidence would have to substitute diffusion capacity and
vital capacity, if possible.
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Administration." Additionally, the attorney may use the pulmo-
nary medical standards devised by the Department of Labor for
determining total disability for coal miners suffering from
pneumoconiosus (black lung disease). 4 It must be emphasized,
however, that these standards are not binding on the administra-
tive law judge; rather, counsel must convince the administrative
law judge to accept the expert medical testimony. To assist in this
task, the services of a vocational expert may be employed. This
expert should examine the claimant and the medical record to de-
termine the residual functional capacity and to ascertain whether
the injured claimant can continue in his or her usual work
activities. 5
To further complicate matters, determinations of the extent of
disability under the LHWCA, as in all workers' compensation
schemes, entail proving either partial or total disability.' For
workers exposed to asbestos dust, these terms assume a special
meaning. Although the Benefits Review Board has recognized lim-
ited situations in which an employee can continue working at his
or her usual job at the same rate of pay and still be considered
totally disabled,57 most working claimants allege partial disability
as covered by section 8(c)(21) of the Act.58 Because in proving a
partial disability under the LHWCA the claimant must show the
difference between the average weekly wage prior to injury and the
wage-earning capacity afterward, 59 claimants having the same or
53. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-.1539 app. 1 & 2 (1980).
54. 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.401-.490 app. (1980); 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.1-.304 (1980).
55. See Pilkington v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 9 BESFirrs REv. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 473 (1978), for the proper use of vocational expert testimony. Once a disability is
proven, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee has had actual opportu-
nities to obtain other work. Perini Corp. v. Heyde, 306 F. Supp. 1321, 1325-26 (D.R.I. 1969).
See also American Stevedores, Inc. v. Salzano, 538 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1976).
57. See Eaddy v. Ruckert Terminals Corp., 10 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 31
(1979). The Board, however, expressly noted that such situations are the exception and not
the rule. Id. at 33. See also Van Dyke v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8
BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 388, 394 (1978) (indicating that partial disability may
become total disability where the claimant voluntarily retires when he is unable or unwilling
to continue working because of disability and age).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21) (1976).
59. Devillier v. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 10 BENEFITS Rav. BD. SERV. (BENDER)
649 (1979).
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higher earnings after the discovery of an occupational asbestos dis-
ease contend that their postinjury wages are not truly determina-
tive of their wage-earning capacity. On the other hand, claimants
who earn less have more tangible evidence of lost earning capacity.
When the lost wage-earning capacity is established, the claimant is
awarded a percentage of the loss corresponding to the extent of the
disability.
Assertions by employers that claimants have no loss in wage-
earning capacity because they are fully employed in their usual
work activity after discovery of the disease have fallen on deaf
ears."0 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
responded succinctly to such an argument by an employer, stating:
[The claimant's] asbestosis created a grave risk of additional, se-
vere pulmonary difficulties should he continue his accustomed
employment involving asbestos exposure. For there to be a dis-
abilty within the meaning of section 902(10) ... an employee
need not be in pain, nor is he required, after injury, to continue
in employment which is medically contraindicated until his con-
dition and pain render it impossible for him to work at all. "The
law does not require, as a prerequisite to recovering compensa-
tion for partial disability due to a compensable occupational dis-
ease, that the ill employee continue to work, until he becomes
physically unable to do so."
... To argue that no restrictions were placed on [claimant],
ignores the fact that medical advice counseled that [claimant]
should work only in an asbestos free environment. That [em-
ployer] failed to provide [claimant] with such an environment
for several years after the advice was given may suggest a cal-
lousness on [employer's] part; it hardly negates the existence of
restrictions on [claimant's] working activities due to his
asbestosis.61
If there is, as this case suggests, almost a presumption of total or
60. See, e.g., Proffitt v. E.J. Bartells Co., 10 BENEFrrs REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 435
(1979); Van Dyke v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8 BENEFITS REV. BD.
SERV. (BENDER) 388 (1978).
61. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. White, 584 F.2d 569, 575 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting Globe
Union, Inc. v. Baker, 310 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 317 A.2d 26 (Del.
1974)).
1980]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
at least partial disability for the purpose of section 8(c)(21) in a
worker diagnosed as having asbestosis, the focus shifts to establish-
ing the claimant's actual wages or some other figure as his or her
postinjury wage-earning capacity. A multitude of factors may influ-
ence the establishment of this figure, including those listed in sec-
tion 8(h) of the Act. 2 Prudent counsel should prepare an estimate
of wage-earning capacity based on an analysis of these factors for
presentation as a stipulation at the hearing. Due to the wide dis-
cretion allowed in adjusting the relevant factors, an estimate
agreed upon by counsel is better than an estimate at which the
administrative law judge is forced to arrive in the absence of the
parties' agreement.
One last comment should be made concerning extent of disabil-
ity. The Act requires a finding of either permanent or temporary
disability. If the claim is based on a progressive and irreversible
occupational disease such as asbestosis and its sequelae, the dis-
ease is clearly a permanent disability. The maximum medical re-
covery point is reached on the day the injury is said to occur. 4
Unless the practitioner is dealing with a short-lived exacerbation
of the underlying pulmonary impairment, which may constitute a
period of temporary total disability, the determination should be
62. In pertinent part, § 8(h) provides:
[Ilf the employee has no actual earnings or his actual earnings do not fairly
and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity, the deputy commissioner
may, in the interest of justice, fix such wage-earning capacity as shall be rea-
sonable, having due regard to the nature of his injury, the degree of physical
impairment, his usual employment, and any other factors or circumstances in
the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition,
including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.
33 U.S.C. § 908(h) (1976).
63. See id. § 908.
64. The maximum medical recovery point is the day on which the claimant's disability
ceases to improve. After this day the claimant's condition will remain stable or deteriorate.
Gray v. General Dynamics Corp., 5 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 279, 282 (1976). The
maximum medical recovery point is important when classifying injuries as either temporary
or permanent. "If the claimant has not reached maximum medical improvement, the award
should be one for temporary disability; if the claimant has reached maximum medical im-
provement, the award should be one for permanent disability." McCray v. Leco Steel Co. 5
BENEFrrs REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 537, 540 (1977). Because a worker's condition only can
worsen when he contracts asbestosis, maximum medical recovery is reached on the day the
worker first contracts asbestosis. Therefore, once asbestosis is shown, the claimant has
proven maximum medical recovery and his disability is permanent.
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that of permanent disability.
Extent of disability questions obviously involve a mix of legal,
economic, and medical issues. So too does the establishment of
causal nexus between asbestos-related diseases and maritime em-
ployment. Because the time bar provisions of the Act do not begin
to run until the claimant is or should have been aware of his or her
injury and of its relation to the employment,65 the employer may
be faced with a claim in which maritime exposure occurred many
years ago and subsequent employment intervened. Therefore a
complete occupational and personal history must be obtained from
the claimant to identify any noncovered work exposure to which
the disease may be attributed. In some circumstances, however, the
fact that the claimant's last exposure to asbestos was in a noncov-
ered situs is not dispositive.66 Because section 20(a) of the Act pro-
vides a presumption of the causal connection between covered
work activity and injury, 7 the claimant must show only exposure
to harmful stimuli while employed and not a distinct aggravation
of the pulmonary condition in order to hold the last maritime em-
ployer responsible."' This presumption, however, may be overcome
by the introduction of evidence, such as nonemployment or an al-
ternate employment source of the disease, that controverts the ex-
istence of the relationship.6 9
65. Section 12 of the Act requires an employee to give notice of the injury within thirty
days unless the employer has knowledge of the injury or death or unless notice is otherwise
excused. Id. § 912. Under § 13 of the Act, an employer or beneficiary has one year after
death or injury in which to file a claim. Id. § 913(a). Secton 13(b) provides, however, that
failure to file a claim does not constitute a bar "unless objection to such failure is made at
the first hearing of such claim in which all parties in interest are given reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard." Id. § 913(b). See the rather extensive treatment of these sections
contained in A BENFrrS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 6-45 to 6-50, 6-120 to 6-121 (1980).
66. See Fulks v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 10 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 340
(1979). In Fulks, the employer was held liable even though the last exposure to the harmful
stimulus was on land in a noncovered situs.
67. "In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chap-
ter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary-(a) That
the claim comes within the provision of this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1976).
68. Proffitt v. E.J. Bartells Co., 10 BENEFITs REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 435, 441 (1979);
Corwin v. Arthur Tickle Eng'r Works, 8 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 170, 171-72
(1978); McCabe v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 1 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER)
509, 514-15 (1975).
69. See Jacomino v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 9 BENEFITS Rav. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 680 (1979); Compton v. Pennsylvania Ave. Gulf Serv. Center, 9 BENEFITS REv. BD.
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Furthermore, under the so-called "last employer" rule, the em-
ployer responsible for the payment of benefits is the one during
whose employment the claimant was last exposed to injurious
stimuli prior to the date of the manifestation of injury to the
claimant.70 Consequently, the allegedly responsible employer may
escape liability if it can show that there was no exposure to harm-
ful stimuli or that the injury was manifest at a time prior to its
employment of the claimant.7 1
Further assignment of causal connection between the disease
SERV. (BENDER) 625 (1979). In Jacomino, a shipyard electrician alleged that his exposure to
asbestos dust during his employment with defendant between 1943 and 1946 led to the
emergence in 1974 of asbestosis symptoms. 9 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) at 682-83.
The claimant alleged that he had no exposure after 1946 and the administrative law judge
found for the claimant on this point. Despite the employer's evidence that asbestos was used
in the shipyards after 1946 and that claimant had continued to work in the shipyards for
other employers, the administrative law judge found that the claimant had had no exposure
after 1946. Id. Before the Board, the employer renewed his argument that the claimant's
subsequent exposure relieved him of resonsibility under the LHWCA. Id. at 683. Although
the Board found the employer's argument persuasive, it could not "conscientously" con-
clude error on the basis of the record and remanded the cause for determination of the
responsible employer. Id. at 683-84.
70. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913
(1955). The court considered it of no consequence that the length of employment with this
"last employer" was so slight that medically the injury could not be attributed to that em-
ployer. Id. The court also held that the carrier who last insured the liable employer prior to
the date the claimant became aware of his occupationally derived disease was the responsi-
ble carrier. Id. For pre-1972 claims, counsel should be aware that more restrictive status and
situs tests are applicable. Thus, the class of employers subject to liability as "last employ-
ers" is more limited in pre-1972 claims. See note 2 supra.
For an alternative approach to imposing liability for injury which may be useful under the
Act, see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980). In Sindell, the Supreme Court of California used the
concept of "market share" liability. The court held that the plaintiff in a products liability
action need not identify the specific manufacturer of the product causing the injury, but
that, rather, the burden of proof is shifted to the manufacturers joined in the suit to show
that their product did not cause the harm. Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
Failing in that burden, the defendants share liability on the basis of the percentage of their
share of the appropriate market. Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
According to this theory, liability would attach to each employer which could not prove that
the claimant was not exposed to asbestos while in its employ. The employer's liability would
be based on its percentage of the total time the claimant was employed in jobs where he was
exposed to asbestos.
71. See Compton v. Pennsylvania Ave. Gulf Serv. Center, 9 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 625 (1979); Sicker v. Muni Marine Co., 8 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 268
(1978) (pointing out the utility of the "awareness doctrine" in establishing the responsible
employer).
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and a particular industrial exposure must await development in
the medical arts. While some evidence suggests that different as-
bestos crystalline structures may cause different disease processes
and that exposure time and concentration limits are important de-
terminative factors, there is little hard data that can identify posi-
tively or eliminate a given industrial exposure from the causation
picture.
The practitioner must not overlook the special fund provisions
of section 8(f) of the Act7 2 in cases of asbestos-related diseases. To
the extent that preexisting pulmonary or cardiac conditions can be
shown to be an "existing permanent partial disability" and the as-
bestos exposure can be shown to be a nonoverriding but contribut-
ing causative factor, this section permits the party defending the
claim to shift liability to a special fund.73 This may be especially
appropriate when the synergistic effect of cigarette smoking and
asbestos produces bronchogenic cancer.74 In addition, the employer
should assert section 8(f) when the claimant suffers from a number
of nonpulmonary physical disorders which produce a total perma-
nent disability only when the effects of his asbestosis are combined
with his nonasbestos caused condition. 7 For example, even in a
situation in which the employer knew of the claimant's underlying
pulmonary disability and retained the employee in a work environ-
ment in which he was exposed to harmful stimuli, the Benefits Re-
view Board has held that section 8(f) is applicable. Reasoning that
72. 33 U.S.C. § 908(0 (1976).
73. Id. §§ 908(f), 944(j)(2). The special fund, established pursuant to § 44 of the Act, 33
U.S.C. § 944 (1976), is maintained by compensation awards for which there is no beneficiary,
fines and penalties, and carrier and self-insurer payments. Id. § 944(c). Charged with admin-
istration of the fund, the Secretary of Labor authorizes disbursements, id. §§ 944(a), (b), to
cover the remainder of benefits to which an employee or his beneficiary is entitled after
cessation of the payments required of the employer. Id. § 908(0(2). Neither the United
States nor the Secretary of Labor, however, is liable for any unpaid benefits if the fund is
depleted. Id. § 944(g).
Section 8(f) is designed to help prevent discrimination against handicapped employees by
allowing employers to limit their liability should a handicapped employee become further
handicapped by industrial accident. The section thus removes a hurdle from the retention
or hiring of disabled employees. Mellroy v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 8 BENEFITS REV. BD.
SERV. (BENDER) 283, 284 (1978). To avail himself of the benefits of § 8(W, however, the
employer must be aware of the disability. Id. at 285.
74. See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
75. See Hess v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 11 BENEFITS REV. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 149 (1979).
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the claimant received special considerations from the employer,
the Board found no intent on the part of the employer to expose
the claimant to harmful stimuli in order to use the fund as a
defense.76
ACTIONS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
Counsel must be aware of claimant or employer actions against
third parties, usually shipowners, whose negligence caused the
work-related injury. Such actions are governed by the provisions of
section 33 of the Act,7 7 a controversial and frequently amended
portion of the law, which represents a legislative attempt to deal
with the interlocking liabilities of the stevedore-employer and the
shipowner arising from the interrelationship of general admiralty
law and the LHWCA.7 8
Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co.79 and Caldwell v. Ogden
Sea Transport, Inc80 are the most recent developments under sec-
tion 33. Both cases construed paragraph (b) of the section, which
provides:
Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compen-
sation order filed by the deputy comissioner or [the Benefits Re-
view] Board shall operate as an assignment to the employer of
all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover dam-
ages against such third person unless such person shall com-
mence an action against such third person within six months af-
ter such award.""
While both the Second Circuit in Rodriguez and the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Caldwell agreed that a plaintiff-longshoreman who fails to
file a third-party action within six months from the date of the
compensation award effectively assigns the right to sue to the em-
76. Mellroy v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 8 BENEFITS Rav. BD. SERV. (BENDER) 283
(1978). But see Frame v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8 BENEFITS REv. BD. SERV.
(BENDER) 855 (1978) (§ 8(f)'s limitation of liability is not available to an employer who
intentionally places an employee in a dangerous position likely to increase the employee's
disability).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
78. See generally 1A BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY §§ 13-14, at 1-23 to 1-27 (7th ed. 1979).
79. 617 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3211 (1980).
80. 618 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1980).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
[Vol. 22:177
ASBESTOS LITIGATION UNDER THE LHWCA
ployer or insurer-subrogee, the courts differed on whether that as-
signment creates a right of action exclusive to the assignee or a
right of action held by the assignee but capable of being revested
in the longshoreman.8 2 The Second Circuit adopted the former po-
sition on the ground that the Supreme Court's recognition of re-
vesting in Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silverclouds3 did not survive the
1959 and 1972 amendments to the Act.8 4 Asserting the continued
vitality of Czaplicki, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
result.8 5
Construing section 33(b) of the Act as it existed prior to the
1959 and 1972 amendments, the Supreme Court held in Czaplicki
that the statutory assignment of the right of action from the long-
shoreman to the employer or insurer-subrogee immediately upon
acceptance of compensation under the LHWCA did not bar a suit
by the longshoreman when there was a conflict of interest between
the employee and the assignee concerning the third-party action.8
As viewed by the Second Circuit in Rodriguez, the Czaplicki rule
was carefully limited by the Court to the peculiar situation
presented there.7 In addition, the 1959 amendment to section
33(b), granting the employee six months within which to institute
suit, obviated the need for the Czaplicki rule. Finally, the court
felt that the prospect of conflict of interest between the longshore-
man and the employer, mentioned by the United States Supreme
82. The position of the Fourth Circuit that revesting is still possible may have support in
the Third, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits. See White v. United States, 507 F.2d
1101 (5th Cir. 1975); McClendon v. Charente S.S. Co., 348 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1965); Potomac
Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Sword Line, Inc, 257
F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1958); Johnson v. Sword Line, Inc., 240 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1957). While
these cases all consider the 1959 amendments, the 1972 amendments merely added the
words "or Board" following "deputy commissioner." Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1262 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976)). Thus, it seems likely that these courts would reach the same result
as the Fourth Circuit in Caldwell.
83. 351 U.S. 525 (1956).
84. Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 617 F.2d at 960-61.
85. Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, Ltd., 618 F.2d at 1044.
86. 351 U.S. at 530-31 (1956). The conflict of interest in Czaplicki involved the insurer's
position as the carrier of both the employer and the potentially liable third parties. As the
Court stated, "the result is that Czaplicki's rights of action were held by the party most
likely to suffer were the rights of action to be successfully enforced." Id. at 530.
87. 617 F.2d at 960. See also Sabol v. Merritt Campan & Scott Corp., 241 F.2d 765, 768
(2d Cir. 1957).
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Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Co.,8
was alleviated by the 1972 amendments to section 5(b) of the Act,
which were designed to eliminate the employer's liability to a ship-
owner created by Ryan89 Accordingly, the court held that unless
the longshoreman sues within six months from receipt of compen-
sation pursuant to an award, the right of action is assigned exclu-
sively to the employer.90
The Fourth Circuit adopted the alternative position that the
Czaplicki principles did survive the 1959 and 1972 amendments to
the Act.9 1 After noting the procedural and substantive difficulties
arising from the application of the Czaplicki conflict of interest
principles, 2 the court formulated a new approach avoiding these
difficulties and building on the primary thrust of Czaplicki.
The fundamental point in Czaplicki is that notwithstanding a
statutory assignment of the longshoreman's right of action, that
right of action may be revested in the longshoreman when it be-
comes manifest that the assignee, with knowledge of its exclu-
sive right to control and prosecute the claim, nevertheless, de-
clines to do so for any reason.93
Based on principles of subrogation and real party in interest,9" the
Fourth Circuit's new standard conditions revesting on the long-
shoreman's formally notifying the assignee, either extrajudicially or
88. 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In Ryan, the injured longshoreman sued the shipowner, who filed
a third-party complaint against the longshoreman's employer, a stevedoring contractor. The
shipowner sought indemnity from the employer for the amount of the shipowner's liability
to the longshoreman on the ground that the employer's negligent loading of cargo had
caused the employee's injury. Reasoning that the employer had breached its implied obliga-
tion to load the cargo onto the ship safely, the Court held that the shipowner was entitled to
recover from the employer. Id. at 135. The LHWCA did not preclude the shipowner's asser-
tion of the employer's contractual liability.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
90. Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 617 F.2d at 961.
91. Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, Ltd., 618 F.2d at 1044 n.6. See also McClendon v.
Charente S.S. Co., 348 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1965).
92. The court identifies the "substantive" problem of Czaplicki as its implication that a
conflict of interest must be one "specifically related to the assignee's relationship with the
third person." Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, Ltd., 618 F.2d at 1045. The "procedural"
problem left by Czaplicki is described as the allocation of the burden of proof on the issue
of conflict of interest. Id. at 1045-46 & nn. 8-9.
93. Id. at 1046.
94. Id. at 1044-45.
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through the device of joining the assignee as an involuntary plain-
tiff under rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of his
desire to prosecute the case. If the assignee then fails to assert
through responsive pleadings its intention to assume control of the
suit, the right of action is said to be reassigned to the
longshoreman.
As these cases illustrate, the uncharted seas of asbestos litigation
under the LHWCA do not end in the administrative arena. Not
only must the practitioner review the case to ascertain the likeli-
hood of success in the compensation case, but he or she also must
be prepared to make a relatively quick judgment on the strength of
a third-party action. Until this conflict in the circuits is resolved,
prudent counsel will file suit within six months of the receipt of
compensation in any new case.
Finally, the effect of Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.91
should be considered. In Bloomer, an injured longshoreman pre-
vailed in a section 33 third-party action against a shipowner. The
United States Supreme Court held that the stevedore's lien for the
amount of compensation paid to the longshoreman, provided for in
section 33(e),9 should not be reduced by a proportionate share of
the longshoreman's legal expenses in obtaining recovery from the
shipowner.98 In other words, as a result of the longshoreman's re-
covery from the shipowner, the stevedore will receive full reim-
bursement for the amount of its compensation payments to the
longshoreman, and the longshoreman will bear the full expense of
litigating his claim against the shipowner. In deciding whether to
sue a third party, counsel must determine whether the proposed
suit will afford the longshoreman additional compensation. If the
potential recovery minus the full amount of attorneys' fees is less
than the prior recovery from the stevedore, the third-party action
would be ill-advised.
95. Id. at 1046.
96. 445 U.S. 74 (1980).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1976).
98. 445 U.S. at 86-88. Because of the language and legislative history of the LHWCA, the
Court refused to apply the equitable common fund doctrine that a third party must bear a
portion of the expenses of a suit which, although prosecuted by another, benefits him. Id. at
931.
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CONCLUSION
That the practitioner must develop an expertise with both the
medical and legal aspects of occupational lung diseases cannot be
overemphasized. Basic understanding of the anatomy and physiol-
ogy of the lungs, medical terminology, diagnostic testing tech-
niques, and the processes by which asbestos dust exposure produce
disease and disability is essential to the successful prosecution or
defense *of a claim under the LHWCA or any state workers' com-
pensation act. Newly developed mass screening techniques which
are highly portable, reasonably inexpensive, nonintrusive, reliable,
and computerized are available.99 As recognition of asbestos-
related diseases and identification of its victims increase, the profi-
ciency of the bar adjudicating these matters will assure expeditious
processing of the claims to the advantage of both worker and em-
ployer. The best input from practitioners will enable adjudicatory
bodies at all levels to render informed decisions in harmony with
the medical realities and legal requirements.
99. Golden, supra note 18, indicates how such mass-screening techniques can be used for
static and exercise pulmonary function testing along with a bloodless diffusion measurement
using an ear oximeter to measure the oxygen saturation of the blood.
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